The Hindu: Published on 29th Oct 2025.
Why in News?
As Bihar prepares for the 2025 Assembly Elections, the issue of political marginalisation of Extremely Backward Castes (EBCs) has gained renewed attention. Despite forming 36% of Bihar’s population, EBCs continue to have minimal political representation, rarely exceeding 10% in the State Assembly.
Background:
The term Extremely Backward Castes (EBCs), also known as Most Backward Castes, refers to around 112 caste groups in Bihar (as per the 2022 caste survey).
These groups were classified in Annexure-I of Bihar’s caste list (the “more backward” castes), while Annexure-II includes the “less backward” or upper OBCs like Yadavs, Kurmis, Koeris, and Banias.
Historically, political dominance in Bihar shifted from upper castes during the Congress era to upper OBCs during the 1990s, leaving the EBCs politically underrepresented despite their demographic strength.
Historical and Political Context:
Karpoori Thakur, Bihar’s former Chief Minister, initiated the “Backward Raj” era by implementing the Mungeri Lal Commission Report (1976) and promoting reservations for backward classes in education and jobs.
He also democratised local governance through panchayat elections (1978), paving the way for EBC participation at the grassroots.
Nitish Kumar extended this inclusivity by providing 20% reservation for EBCs and 50% for women in Panchayati Raj Institutions (2006), enhancing local-level EBC representation.
However, representation at the State Assembly level remained low—only 10% EBC MLAs despite the group’s 36% population share.
Present Situation:
EBC political mobilisation remains fragmented due to internal diversity—most castes have less than 1% population share.
Some relatively larger EBC groups (1–3% each) include Teli, Dhanuk, Kumhar (Prajapati), Nai, Kahar, and Mallah.
The Nishad community (a coalition of 22 EBC castes) now forms about 9.8% of Bihar’s population and has shown signs of political consolidation through the Vikassheel Insaan Party (VIP) led by Mukesh Sahani.
Still, Nishad leadership remains scattered across major parties like BJP, JD(U), and Congress, weakening their unified bargaining power.
Key Issues and Challenges:
Fragmentation within EBCs: Too many small caste groups hinder collective political mobilisation.
Symbolic Representation: Appointments like Renu Devi (Deputy CM, 2020) and Ali Anwar (Rajya Sabha) have been more symbolic than transformative.
Grassroots Disconnect: Despite better local representation, economic upliftment and structural empowerment remain limited.
Dominance of Upper OBCs: Castes like Yadavs and Kurmis continue to lead backward politics, sidelining EBC aspirations.
Emerging Trends:
Political parties, particularly JD(U), RJD, and VIP, have begun fielding more EBC candidates in anticipation of the 2025 elections.
Congress and BJP lag in EBC inclusion during ticket distribution.
Focus communities for nomination remain limited—mainly Dhanuk, Mallah, Noniya, and Teli among Hindus, and Ansari/Momin among Muslims.
Impact and Implications:
The EBC vote bank—constituting over one-third of Bihar’s population—is likely to become a decisive factor in the 2025 elections.
Increased representation could reshape Bihar’s caste-based politics, making it more inclusive.
However, without economic empowerment, political inclusion alone cannot ensure social justice or long-term development for EBCs.
Conclusion: